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Abstract:
Purpose: Political parties spend significant amounts of  resources during their election campaigns, which
are  usually  designed  in  a  sub-optimal  and informal  way.  This  study aims to provide  a  mathematical
framework for political  parties  to optimize their  election campaigns,  so that  they can maximize  their
performance in the elections.
Design/methodology/approach: In this work, we provide certain mathematical relations to determine
the minimum necessary number of  votes to gain additional seats in an election region under the D’hondt
election rule. Also we develop a convenient mathematical model that optimizes the resource allocation
scheme  of  a  political  party  to  maximize  the  potential  seats  won.  We  test  our  models  on  Turkish
Parliamentary elections data
Findings: Our results show that with various basic assumptions, which are suitable for real life cases, one
can obtain significant gains in the election outcomes even with small budgets. We also provide the relations
among swing vote rates, unit vote costs and budget with the number seats won in a parliament.
Originality/value: This study provides useful insights for both political party management teams as well
as researchers. Political parties need to conduct more market research to collect and work on election data
to increase their performances. From the research perspective, to the best of  our knowledge, this is one of
first  studies  that  approaches  to  the  election  campaigns  for  the  D’hondt  system  with  mathematical
optimization tools.
Keywords: election campaign optimization, D’hondt rule, integer programming
1. Introduction
During the election campaign periods, political parties spend a lot effort to introduce themselves and invest their
resources to convince voters (Mueller, 2003). Given that each political party already has a loyal base community,
what becomes important is persuading the so called swing voters - the voters who do not have a clear decision
about their choice. Election campaign optimization problem (ECOP) can be described as finding the best way to
allocate a political party’s resources among different election locations in order to maximize the seats or member of
parliaments (MPs) won. The level of  effect of  advertising on earning votes or winning elections has been studied
extensively in the sense of  determining the best advertising strategy or determining the marketing mix (Steenburg,
2015).  However,  most  of  the  studies  focus  on determining  the  magnitude  and significance  of  the  effect  of
spending through various regression analysis methods. The work of  Jacobson (1978) is one of  the first studies that
tests the significance of  financial support for success in elections using regression analysis. The results indicate a
positive relation between the two and the significance of  this relation is even higher for the challengers than for the
incumbents. Welch (1980) claims that usually largest contributions are given to likely winners or to the states with
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close competition. After these two works, there are many other studies focusing on the significance of  spending
money for gaining votes. Most studies report a positive correlation between the two, however some studies claim
that the effect is statistically insignificant (Fisher, 1999). Also there is still an ongoing discussion about the higher
significance of  money for challengers rather than the incumbents (Benoit & Marsh, 2010)
In the optimization context several different aspects of  the problem are studied by various researchers. Fleck (1999)
works  on  how voting  influences  the  allocation  of  governmental  resources  by  an  optimization  model  which
maximizes the probability of  re-election under a limiting budget constraint. Belenky (2008) proposes a knapsack
model for approximately calculating the minimal fraction of  the popular vote that can elect a US President in the
Electoral College. Ostapenko, Ostapenko, Belyaeva and Stupnitskaya (2012) formulated the problem of  choosing
an optimal strategy for allocating the scarce resources among regions in which political  parties compete with
different levels of  influence. The analysis is carried out using a game theoretic approach and the existence of  a
unique equilibrium is proved. 
In this study our objective is to determine the election regions to focus or to market heavily so that the party wins
extra MPs in those regions. For this purpose, first the amount of  swing votes for each election region and the
minimum amount of  votes needed to pass the opponent to win extra seat(s) are computed. We assume D’hondt
election rule and derive mathematical formulae to exactly deter-mine the threshold values. Next, we develop a
binary  integer  program (BIP)  representing  the  election  campaign  optimization  problem.  Finally,  we  perform
detailed computational analysis on the Turkish Parliamentary elections to test our methodology, which is generic
and can be applied to many different election methods easily.
The  organization  of  the  paper  is  as  follows:  In  Section  2  and  3,  basic  assumptions  and  the  mathematical
methodology are presented. In Section 4, the details of  the ECOP and the mathematical formulation are provided.
In Section 5 experimental studies and results are presented. The last section concludes the paper.
2. Election Model and D’hondt Rule
D’hondt Rule is one of  the multiple-winners election method which are used to determine the allocation of  seats in
the countries having a parliamentary. It has been successfully used in more than 40 countries (Argentina, Belgium,
Brazil, Denmark, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Turkey, Uruguay, and Wales are some examples). According to
the D’hondt rule the number of  MPs in an election region which has N seats are distributed among the parties
according to the following steps. First, the votes of  each party are divided into N consecutive numbers from 1 to N
to determine the so called “quotients”. Next, all quotients are ranked in a descending order to construct a sorted
list. Finally, N seats are allocated one-by-one to the parties whose quotients are in the top N ranks of  the sorted list.
Denominator Party-1 Party-2 Party-3 Party-4
/1 10,000(1) 8,000(2) 5,500(3) 2,000
/2 5,000(4) 4,000(5) 2,750 1,000
/3 3,333(6) 2,666 1,833 666
/4 2,500 2,000 1,375 500
/5 2,000 1,600 1,100 400
/6 1,666 1,333 916 333
Seats Won 3 2 1 0
True Proportion 2.36 1.88 1.29 0.47
Table 1. Illustration of  the D’hondt Method
A simple example for an election region that has N = 6 seats with I = 4 different political parties is given in Table 1.
In the example, the total votes of  four parties add up to 25,500 and the votes of  each party are displayed in the first
row. Next, the remaining quotients are calculated by dividing the votes to 2-6. The top 6 entries and their rank in
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the quotient list are displayed in bold, ranging from 10,000 to 3,333, for each of  which the corresponding party
wins a seat. The total number of  seats are displayed in the “Seats Won” row. Also the last row shows the true
proportion, which is the theoretical fractional values for the number of  seats won by each party. For example
Party-1 would won ([10,000/25,500]x6 = 2.36) seats in proportion of  the votes received.
Before the elections many market research companies conduct polls to predict the election results. In these polls
usually the competing parties are listed along with the two extra options: undecided and not attending. Next, the
votes of  undecided (or sometimes both undecided and not attending) are distributed proportionally to each party
and updated results are presented. Given the loyal voters or the voters whose decisions are exact, the remaining
undecided voters (also called the swing voters) are of  great importance. Because it has been observed many times
that the final decisions of  the swing voters have a considerable effect on the outcomes of  the elections. In this
study, we assume that political parties perform marketing activities to convince these swing voters. Given that each
party is already spending a certain resource for their marketing activities, the crucial choice of  allocating additional
resources to some specific election regions may help a party to win extra seats, especially in closely competing
regions. Therefore, it is very important to estimate the number of  necessary votes to change the winner or change
the seat distribution for each province.
3. Calculating the Amount of  Necessary Votes
The mathematical relations to determine the minimum amount of  necessary votes to win an extra seat under the
D’hondt rule are presented in this section. First, we will start with the simplest case where there are only two
competing parties, next we are going to extend our results for multiple party case. Let  I show the set of  parties
attending to the election with |I| =  I. Assume that according to the poll results the votes of  the participating
parties are estimated and the vote for party i is vi, iI. Also let vs be the expected amount of  swing votes according
to the polls. Then the total amount of  valid votes is expected to be vT = vs + ∑iI vi.
Assume that there are  N seats to be distributed among two political parties with expected base votes v1 and v2,
respectively and v1 > v2. Thus the total votes for the election region is vT = v1 + v2 + vs. Let q1k and q2k show the set
of  quotients computed by dividing the votes of  each party to the D’hondt divisors k = 1, 2, …, N, so q11 = v1,
q12 = v1/2, ..., q1N = v1/N. Also let’s assume that out of  a total of  N seats the first party is taking n1 of  them and the
second party is taking n2, where n1 + n2=N and n1 ≥ n2. Therefore the n1-th quotient of  first party should be greater
than the n2-th quotient of  the second party, otherwise the n1-th seat would go to the second party. Mathematically,
q1n1 > q2n2, or equivalently v1/n1 > v2/n2. Let’s define λ = (n2 + 1)/n1, showing the ratio between the next number
greater than the number of  seats won by the challenger to the number of  seats of  the incumbent party.
Before the additional marketing campaign by the challenger party, the swing votes vs are split among the two parties
proportional to their estimated votes. After the split of  swing votes, the total votes of  parties are v1 + v1/(v1 + v2) >
v2 + v2/(v1 + v2). Now when the challenger performs the extra marketing activities and persuades vx voters where
vx < vs then only remaining swing votes (vs – vx) are split between two parties proportional to their base votes. Upon
this, we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Given a total of  N  seats and two competing parties,  then the minimum number of  votes vx
necessary for the challenger party to win one extra seat, i.e., n2 + 1 seats under the D’hondt rule is: 
(1)
where λ = (n2 + 1)/n1.
Proof. After the marketing campaign of  the challenger to win an extra seat the last winning quotient of  the incumbent should
be exceeded by the first non-winning quotient of  the challenger, which is mathematically stated as:
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After replacing (n2+1)/n1with λ and expanding the terms we obtain,
Since v1 + v2 + vs = vT. and after grouping the terms,
If  the amount of  swing votes  vs in a region is greater than  vx,  then there is definitely an opportunity for the
challenger party to win an extra seat. Conversely, for those election regions with  vs < vx, there is no chance of
winning an extra seat even if  all the swing voters are convinced to choose the challenger party.
In the multiple party case with  I > 2, the ranked quotients of  parties would be mixed. Thus to determine the
necessary votes required for an additional seat, one has to consider the last winning quotients of  all the parties
which are expected to win at least one seat. When the challenger party aims to win an extra seat, they must increase
their vote levels such that their last non-winning quotient exceeds at least one of  the last winning quotients of  the
competitors. We extend the definition of  l such that λi = (nk + 1)/ni as the ratio between the rank of  the last non-
winning quotient of  the challenger party k and the rank of  the last winning quotient, i.e. number of  seats of  the
competitor party i. Then the minimum amount of  extra votes vx the challenger party k needs to win an extra seat
by additional marketing activities is calculated by the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Given a total of  N seats and I competing parties with a total vote of  vT = vs + ∑iI vi, the minimum
necessary amount of  votes vx for an extra seat under the D’hondt rule is vx >arg min iI {vxi} where the vxi values are
computed from the following formula:
(2)
This formula is exactly the same as (1), with an additional term vRi in the denominator, where vRi = vT – vi – vk, that is
the sum of  the basic votes of  all the remaining parties other than party i and k.
Proof. After the marketing campaign of  the challenger party k to win an extra seat the last winning quotient of  at
least  one competitor  party should be exceeded by the first  non-winning quotient of  the challenger,  which is
mathematically stated as:
After  replacing (nk + 1)/ni  with  λi,  expanding,  re-arranging the terms and solving for  vxi,  then choosing the
minimum of  them, the necessary amount of  votes is computed.
4. A Mathematical Model for ECOP
After determining the minimum amount of  necessary votes required for each region, a political party can use them
under a decision making framework to find which election regions to focus. For this purpose we develop a BIP,
which picks the best locations to invest for winning the most number of  extra seats. 
Let j  J represent the set of  election regions. Also let B be the total available budget for the political party, which is
comprised of  all kind of  funds acquired by the party (Soberman & Sadoulet, 2007).
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In this model, the decisions are to invest or not in region j to win the k-th extra seat, which are represented with a
set of  binary decision variables xjk. Under a parliamentary system the number of  MPs that can be selected from a
region is usually more than one. Especially in populous regions, where the number of  swing votes is respectively
much higher than the average votes necessary for a single MP, a party can aim to win more than one additional
MPs. To include this fact into the model, a second index k is introduced representing the k-th additional MP in
region j.
Let  mjk be the minimum amount of  votes necessary to win the k-th seat in region j. They are computed by the
formulae presented in the previous section. Also let cjk be the total cost to persuade at least mjk swing voters to win k
more MP in region j. They are calculated by multiplying mjk with a constant p - the unit cost of  persuading a single
person with the help of  marketing activities.  Determining  p is  a hard task as it  is  difficult  to materialize the
monetary value to persuade an individual by a political party’s marketing campaign. However, there are many
studies that focus on how to find the unit cost of  a vote (Benoit & Marsh, 2010). Let Kj be the maximum possible
number of  MPs that can be selected from region j. Kj are determined by identifying the last index k where ∑k mjk ≤
sj holds, meaning that the potentially available swing votes in a region is large enough for a party to win Kj seats.
Given these definitons the mathematical model ECOP is as follows:
ECOP:
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
In ECOP the objective function (3) maximizes the total seats won by summing all possible decision variables
corresponding to the available regions and seats in those regions. The constraint (4) is the budget restriction. The
total cost of  investment in all regions and for all available seats is given by the sum ∑iJ ∑kKj cjk xjk, which is limited
by the available budget B. Constraints (5) dictate the priority relationship of  selected MPs in the same region. For
instance, if  a party invests cj1 dollars, they win one more MP in region j. To be able to win the second MP in the
same region, they should invest at least cj1 + cj2 dollars, so xj2 ≤ xj1 should be satisfied. This formulation is similar to
the Partially Ordered Knapsack Problem, which is known to be NP-hard in the strong sense (Borradaile, Heeringa
& Wilfong, 2012). When we aim for only one MP from each region, then the k-index can be dropped from the
formulation and constraints  (5)  are  not  required anymore,  so the remaining problem reduces to the  classical
Knapsack Problem. Lastly the model ends with binary restrictions on the decision variables (6). Also, it is assumed
that the campaigns are all local (region-wise) and no nation-wide campaigns are carried out (or their region-wise
effect is ignorable). It is stated that similar to nationwide advertising, local advertising helps to gain votes (Put,
Maddens & Smulders, 2015). When this optimisation model is solved, the solution provides the optimal investment
decision for a political party, which is the list of  regions and how many seats in each region to be targeted.
5. Computational Results
The computational results on the performance of  our mathematical model as well as some insights on the effect of
certain parameters of  the problem on the optimal solution are presented in this section.
The 2015 June Turkish Parliamentary Election data is used in our analysis, where 4 major parties compete. There
are some other small parties as well as independent candidates but to simplify the computations, they are discarded
from the data. There are 85 election regions in Turkey with a total of  550 seats. The results are displayed with
respect to the second party in terms of  total seats won. The analysis can be repeated with the remaining three
parties as well. We run our tests by analyzing the three parameters: Budget (B), swing vote percentage (s) and unit
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vote cost (r). For the budget, there are 96 different values from B = 50,000 to, B = 1,000,000 (increasing by 10,000).
For the swing vote percentage 20 different levels, s = 1% to s = 20%, are tested. Lastly, for the unit cost of  a vote
50 different values ranging between r=1 to r=50 are tested. In total the number of  scenarios tested is 96 × 50 × 20
= 96,000.
(a) Budget vs MPs won with different swing vote rates (b) Budget vs MPs won with different unit vote costs
Figure 1. Effect of  Budget on MPs won
The integer programs are coded in C# environment and CPLEX 12.6 callable Library is used. The results are
displayed in Figure 1-3. 
According to Figure 1, even a small budget can result in significant number of  additional seats (5 to 10) and the
effects of  swing votes or unit vote cost can be easily tracked. As the unit costs decrease and swing vote rate
increases, the gain increases. Also notice the diminishing returns behaviour, where the number of  seats gained per
constant increase in budget decreases and even stops (around 30 seats).
(a) Unit Cost vs MPs won with different budgets (b) Unit Cost vs MPs won with different swing vote rates
Figure 2. Effects of  Unit Vote Cost on Number of  MPs won
Figure 2 presents the effects of  unit vote cost. When the unit costs are small its effect on the seats won is high but
after a certain value its effect drastically decreases.
Lastly, Figure 3 displays the relation between swing vote percentage and the number of  MPs won. For smaller
values of  unit votes cost and for larger values of  budget, the effect is more significant as expected. Similar to the
effects of  budget on MPs won (Figure 1) the effects diminish at higher levels of  swing vote. 
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(a) Swing Vote Rate vs MPs won with unit costs (b) Swing Vote Rate vs MPs won with different budget levels
Figure 3. Effects of  Swing Vote Rate on Number of  MPs won
6. Conclusions
This study focuses on Election Campaign Optimization Problem, which is a critical issue in many countries ruled
by democracy. We provide certain mathematical relations to determine the minimum necessary number of  votes to
gain  additional  seats  in  an  election  region  under  the  D’hondt  election  rule.  Also  we  develop  a  convenient
mathematical model that optimizes the resource allocation scheme of  a political party to maximize the potential
seats won within the existence of  undecided voters. We test our models on Turkish Parliamentary elections data and
find out that even small budgets can result in significant gains. Further research can be conducted on how the effect
of  nationwide campaigns be incorporated to the optimization scheme, as well as how the inherent stochastic nature
of  political elections can be reflected by designing a stochastic optimization problem.
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